Tardantiqua (Project Tardantiqua in Byzantine Centre at Hellenic Institute)

In general outline, F. Curta’s conception can be reduced to the following. In the second half of the sixth century in barbarian communities situated on the left bank of the Lower Danube the processes of social stratification developed very intensively that brought to the rise of military leaders — big-men. The new system of values was formed around them. Among those who would be lately called «Slavs» especial significance was acquired by the markers of social status, namely silver female fibulae and other elements of female dress of the certain style. Women become «symbolic vehicles for the construction of social identity» (P. 309). It was that symbolic style and social competition that formed Slavic «Sñlavinias».
Thus, political and social development was going on in parallel with ethnogenesis. It means that the mixed population was concentrated around centers of power, which «metaphorically cited» (imitated and copied) the prestige centers of their more powerful neighbors. Those, whom Byzantine authors have named «Slavs» were formed in Carpathian and Lower Danube Region under the influence of their neighbors, and did not migrate there from the north: «Archaeological culture do not migrate», Curta argues (P. 307). It is known, meanwhile, that migration is an extremely complicated problem in archaeology that cannot be described by one phrase (see Lev S. Klejn’s detailed analysis of the problem). The idea of the «self-generation» of the Slavs in the Danube and Carpathian region and the negation of their migration can be considered to be the heart of Curta’s conception and his main contribution to studies on the models of Slavic ethnogenesis. To Curta, instead of the Slavs themselves their language spread as lingua franca (P. 345) (however, there is not clear — from where?). But even the language has not played the important role in Slavic ethnogenesis: as Curta argues, «Slavs did not become Slavs because they spoke Slavic, but because they were called so by others», i.e. by the Byzantines (P. 346). The Slavs arisen in such a strange, almost magic, way were for some time the neighbors of the Empire, being partially under the authority of the Avar qagan, and limited their external activity to plundering raids on the Balkans. Slavs did not break the Byzantine limes on the Danube, but they also did not infiltrated peacefully through the system of forts. They came on the Balkans after the limes had been already destructed. In Curta’s opinion, «“Sclavenes” was an umbrella-term for various groups living beyond the fron- tier» (P. 118). «What all this suggests, in my opinion, is that the name “Sclavene” was a purely Byzantine construct, designed to make sense of a complicated configuration of ethnies on the other side of the northern frontier of the Empire» (P. 118–119). «In its most strictly defined sense, however, the “Sclavene ethnicity” is a Byzantine invention» (P. 119). However, Curta’s statement contradicts directly the well-known passage from Theophylact Simocatta, where it is described, how three barbarians-ambassadors met by the emperor Maurice’s men near Tzurullum in c. 591, on the emperor’s question of what was their nation and where they lived, answered, that they were Sclavenes by nation and that they lived at the boundary of the western Ocean.
Only one thing remains unclear from Curta’s book: HOW could the Byzantines invent the Slavs? What was the mechanism of influence of this Constantinople armchair invention on the population of such a distant frontier region?

"SUMMARY
The Secret of Justinian’s Army:
The Eastern Roman Army in 491—641 A.D.
by Petr V. Shuvalov
The introductory chapter («The Puzzle of Justinian’s Re-Conquest») is devoted to explaining why under the emperor Justinian (527—565) the Roman army could re-conquer for a while all what had been lost by the Empire for the preceding one hundred years. This matter is really worthy of explanation because during just two decades of the re-conquest (533—552) Justinian restored control over the same territories that had formerly been seized by the Roman Republic after two centuries of extremely hard fighting — from the First Samnite war through the Third Punic war (343—146 B.C.).
The chapters «The Age of Changes» and «The Heritage of the Tetrarchs: the Later Roman Administration and the Army» provide a brief survey of the position of the Empire and the condition of its army as well by the early 6th century. The most terrible defeat of the Later Roman troops by the barbarian peoples took place on August 9, 379 near the city of Adrianople (in Thrace), when the emperor Valens’ army was smashed by the Goths and their allies. Its chief reasons were not only Valens’ own strategic errors, but also the tactical advantage of the Gothic and Alanic cavalry over the Roman mounted force.
The disaster at Adrianople had to make the deepest impression upon the military elite of the Empire and so to lead to a revision of the entire imperial war doctrine. Somewhat later already, the military theoretician Vegetius wrote that the Roman cavalry of his days is organized per sample of the Goths and Alans. To all appearances, after 378 the Romans actively began to adopt the barbarian experiences of conducting a mobile battle with the use of large masses of cavalry, some armed with lances like the Goths and Alans, others — with bows like the Huns. In the text of the later military treatise, «Strategikon» by Pseudo-Maurice, there is the description of equestrian exercises, which rather date from a period of around the 4th — 5th centuries. There are references to five kinds of training, viz. «Scythian», «Alanic», «African», «Illyrian» and «Italic». The origins of the first two exercises seem to go back to the events of the late 4th century. Nevertheless, in spite of these reforms, the Romans lacked their own well-trained light-armed cavalry, as not so many Roman cavalrymen could be compared to the nomads, spending all the life on horseback, in the art of horse-riding and bow-shooting. And so, since 394 up to 439, under the outstanding Roman generals such as Stilicho, Aetius and others in the composition of the Roman army there were mounted troops composed by Hun mercenaries, who repeatedly demonstrated their high martial skills. In the former half of the 5th century, the Roman army would have increased, at last, a role of cavalry; however, in the 470s we can observe again the previous army structure in the Balkans. The catastrophic defeats and failures that occurred in the late 4th and in the mid-5th centuries certainly forced the conservative Roman military elite to revise the obsolete principles of waging war. Nevertheless, this revision process went so slowly that the infantry remained as the main army force until the end of the 5th century. Just the reforms of the next century changed such a situation at last! Since then, the role of infantry became auxiliary only, whereas the main place in the army composition began to belong to cavalry.
In the following chapter («The Barbarians and Barbarian Innovations: auxilia, numeri, foederati, buccellarii») the author joins the opinions expressed by D. Hoffman (1969), R. Schulz (1993); R. Scharf (2001), E. P. Glušanin (1991), M. Speidel (1994), O. Schmitt (1994), J. Haldon (1984), as well as refutes the schemes put forward by F. Aussaress (1909). In particular, he states that the foederati as a kind of armed force must have appeared no earlier than during the reign of Theodosius I (379–395), who organized two or three tens of such new units numbering 10,000—15,000 soldiers in total and consisting mostly of Goths by birth. Indeed in the 6th century, there were normally 10—13 tagmata composed of foederati in the imperial service.
The chapters to go next («Just Before the Spurt (474—518): the Isaurian Zeno and the Reformer Anastasius», «In Chase of the Past Grandeur: the Conqueror Justinian», «Between the Shahanshah and the Kaghan: Tiberius’ Strictness, Maurice’s Economy and Phocas’ Nearsightedness», and «To Deal with the Armenians According to the Avar Scheme: Heraclius as a Warrior and Politician» are devoted to considering both the events at the fronts and the changes in the army administration.
The crisis situation in the Eastern Roman army is reflected by the noted treatise «Strategikon» usually attributed to the emperor Maurice (582—602). However, the best of the surviving manuscripts points at Urbicius as its author. He may have been the same person as Urbicius, the Eastern Roman general in the rank of the magister militum per Orientem, nicknamed Barbatus («Bearded Man»), who acted at the court of the emperor Anastasius (491—518). The text of this treatise is multilayer, and it obviously contains fragments of earlier writings. The oldest layer is a collection of fragments from several treatises dedicated to warfare matters. Close to them is the anonymous treatise «De militari scientia» (or the «Byzantine anonymous»). The main enemies for Urbicius (see the chapter «Perception of the Enemy: Neighbours of the Empire») are the peoples well known to him as good horsemen or even as exceptionally horsemen (nomads). Such are first of all the Hunno-Bulghars («Scythians», but not the Avars!), then the Persians and finally the Germanic peoples («Blond-haired»). As it may be observed from the text of the «Strategikon», Urbicius was very solicitous about how not to cede these foes in the art of fast maneuvering mounted warfare at a distance, with the use of the bow. It is difficult to say for sure when and in which volume within Anastasius’ reign so timely a reform was put into practice in the imperial forces.
Further military reforms were realized in the age of Justinian, perhaps following his cousin Germanus’ initiative. Their traces can be seen in both the Pseudo-Maurice’s treatise and the works of Procopius of Caesarea. The reforms included a scheme of the army array envisaging individual mobile tactical units (the so-called cursores-defensores and plagiophylakes-hyperkerastai), as well as a two- or three-line battle order. It seems quite possible that an idea to detach the cursores and defensores came to the Latin-language milieu of the Roman army from the Alans and the Moors. On the other hand, the two- or three-line battle order with the plagiophylakes and hyperkerastai is rather a study innovation that appeared, judging by the Greek denominations of these units, in the midst of the high nobility of the Eastern Roman Empire; at the same time, this novelty may have been worked out by analogy with some achievements in the Western Mediterranean, in Italy.
In scholarly literature (Mazzucchini, 1981) there is the opinion that such a tactical scheme to be seen in «Strategikon» has no support in other sources. Indeed, the contemporary writings do not contain any of the terms in question. However, the fact is that the author of the «Strategikon» is a very cautious person frequently warning his readers against any broad spread of the available information about the tactical schemes and methods of the imperial army. Therefore, it is not surprising at all that one cannot find in any other texts direct references to all of the tactical details which are in Pseudo-Maurice’s work. Nevertheless, between Procopius’ lines we can discern some traces of these reforms, especially if we carefully examine the structure of a regiment and its armament (see the chapter «A Regiment as it is on Parchment and in Reality: its Nominal Structure, Composition and Armed Elements»), as well as plans of the main battles (see the chapter «The Army on Battle-Field: the Famous Battles in the Age of Justinian»).
The present author shares the conclusion made long ago by the noted Hungarian researcher E. Darkó that the final version of Pseudo-Maurice’s treatise, although it had taken the form close to the modern one in 592—610 already, was composed in the reign of the emperor Heraclius (610—641). It is then that the reforms in the making of a new, universal, cavalry after the Avar model were completed.
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